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INTRODUCTION
Single asset Chapter 11 cases have been filed in rapidly increasing
numbers in recent years. Hit by real estate recessions in the mid-1970's
and mid-1980's, innumerable single asset partnerships and corporations,
formed only to acquire and manage their one investment asset, have
sought the protection of the bankruptcy court. Often ified with little pur-
pose but to postpone foreclosure, and with no serious hope of reorganiza-
tion, single asset cases have met harsh reactions from many courts. But
single asset debtor reorganization proceedings have a long history and,
on closer examination, are not fundamentally different from the more
ordinary case involving multiple assets and more numerous creditors. A
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single asset debtor with a realistic plan to restructure its obligations, and
with the legitimate desire and ability to do so, can sometimes overcome
the many obstacles in Chapter 11 and emerge with a successful plan of
reorganization.
I. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Single asset bankruptcy cases are not new. They first blossomed
under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which was enacted as
a part of the Chandler Act in 1938. Chapter XII, entitled "Real Prop-
erty Arrangements by Persons Other Than Corporations," was precipi-
tated by the then-common situation in which an individual or
partnership owned real estate for which it was obligated on bond issues
secured by trust indentures and owned by large numbers of individual
holders. Although Chapter XII was not limited to "single asset" cases,
most debtors who sought its protection owned a single parcel of real es-
tate, typically a developed property such as an apartment house or office
building. Increasing numbers of such individuals and partnerships found
themselves unable to pay their bond issues during the depression years of
the 1930's, particularly in Chicago and in some northeastern cities.
Chapter XII was designed for these individual and partnership debtors.
Chapter XII combined the most pertinent provisions of Chapter X (cor-
porate reorganizations) and Chapter XI (arrangements of unsecured
debt), which were also enacted as a part of the Chandler Act.1
After an initial spurt of Chapter XII cases in the late 1930's and
early 1940's, Chapter XII fell into disuse for many years. Indeed, from
1938 until 1974, there were only seven reported decisions concerning
confirmation of Chapter XII plans of reorganization.2 But a real estate
recession in the mid-1970's, "triggered by... tight money and substan-
tial inflation in the construction industry and compounded around 1973
by the oil embargo and resultant inflation of 1973-74," seemed to awaken
an interest in Chapter XII.3 The number of cases filed under that chap-
ter escalated from 92 in 1973, to 172 in 1974, to 280 in 1975, and to 525
in 1976.4 Not surprisingly, beginning in 1974, there was "a veritable
1. See generally Weinstein, The Debtor Relief Chapters of the Chandler Act, 5 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 1, 18-20 (1938); Note, Compositions and Extensions Under the Chandler Act, 87 U. PA. L.
RFv. 837 (1939).
2. See Anderson and Ziegler, Real Property Arrangements Under the Old and New Bankruptcy
Acts, 25 LoY. L. REV. 713, 713 n. 2 (1979).
3. In re Pine Gate Associates, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478, 1480 n. 12 (Bankr. N. D. Ga. 1976).
4. Id.
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explosion" of reported decisions analyzing plans of reorganization and
other issues in Chapter XII cases.'
Despite the inclusion in the Bankruptcy Act of a chapter dealing
primarily with single asset real estate cases, and despite the large number
of such cases filed in the five years immediately preceding the enactment
of the Bankruptcy Code, the drafters of the Code made little attempt to
focus on single asset cases. Unlike the provisions of the Chandler Act,
the Bankruptcy Code includes no separate chapter for real estate cases;
indeed, the Code includes not a single provision applicable only to single
asset or real estate cases. 6
Only two issues addressed by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code
had particular relevance to the single asset case. The first was the so-
called "cash out" of the undersecured creditor. The issue arose in a case
in which the debtor owned real estate secured by a nonrecourse obliga-
tion; where the property was valued at an amount less than the secured
obligation, the debtor could propose a plan in which the secured creditor
would be paid an amount equal to the value of the property, allowing the
debtor to retain the property and to discharge the nonrecourse defi-
ciency. A single asset debtor succeeded in such a strategy in In Re Pine
Gate Associates, Ltd.7 This result was thought to be unfair, since it al-
lowed the debtor to retain all the benefits of any post-confirmation appre-
ciation in the value of the property while paying no more than the
appraised value as determined by the court at the time of confirmation.
Congress enacted section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to cure
this unfairness. Section 1111(b) gives the undersecured nonrecourse
creditor an option between (1) making its claim in the full amount of the
secured indebtedness, or (2) making a secured claim only to the extent of
the value of the property, while making an unsecured (recourse) claim
for the deficiency. These provisions make it much more difficult,
although not impossible, to effect a "cash out" of an undersecured credi-
tor in a single asset real estate case.8
A second issue addressed by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code
had particular relevance to the single asset case: the secured creditor's
5. Anderson and Zeigler, supra note 2.
6. See generally In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 Bankr. 560, 562-66 (Bankr. W.D.Tex.
1989), aff'd, No. A-89-CA-667 (W.D.Tex. 1990, appeal filed.)
7. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976).
8. See generally In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 Bankr. at 560-66; Stein, Section
1111(b): Providing Undersecured Creditors with Post-Confirmation Appreciation in the Value of the
Collateral, 56 AM. BANKR. L. J. 195 (1982).
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entitlement to relief from the automatic stay. Bankruptcy Code section
362(d) sets forth the standards under which a creditor is entitled to relief
from the stay. The statute, as enacted, does not refer specifically to single
asset cases, but the legislative history points to section 362(d)(2) as the
focus of Congress' concern for the treatment of such cases. That provi-
sion requires the court to grant relief from the automatic stay as to prop-
erty of the debtor upon a finding of two separate facts: (a) that the debtor
has no equity in the property, and (b) that the property is not necessary
to an effective reorganization. Although the Bankruptcy Code as
adopted does not elaborate on this standard, the bill passed by the Senate
included a provision stating that for the purpose of section 362(d), "prop-
erty is not necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor if it is
real property on which no business is being conducted by the debtor
other than the business of operating the real property and activities inci-
dental thereto."9  The Senate Report accompanying the bill explained
that the provision was directed at single-asset cases:
The intent of this exception is to reach the single asset apartment type
cases which involve primarily tax shelter investments and for which
the bankruptcy laws have provided a too-facile method to relay [sic]
conditions, but not the operating shopping center or hotel cases where
attempts at reorganization should be permitted.10
The effect of the Senate's proposed amendment to section 362(d)(2) was
twofold: first, only properties held solely for investment or appreciation,
and from which the debtor operates no ongoing business, were by defini-
tion not necessary to an effective reorganization; and second, single asset
cases involving properties held solely for investment would nevertheless
survive a motion for relief from stay under section 362(d)(2) if, but only
if, the debtor had equity in the property.
It is the converse of these propositions that is important here: at
least some single asset cases - those from which the debtor operates a
business and those in which the debtor has equity - were not subject to
attack under section 362(d)(2). The final version of the Bankruptcy
Code did not, of course, contain the Senate amendment. But statements
on the floors of the House and Senate by members of the Conference
Committee indicate that the final version was intended to have the same
effect."
9. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 354, 124 CONG. REc. 25,382 (1978).
10. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978).
11. See 124 CONG. REC. 28,259 (1978) (remarks of Senator DeConcini).
[Vol. 26:523
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It is therefore clear that while neither section 1111(b) nor section
362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code refers specifically to single asset cases,
both are of particular relevance to such cases. But these statutory provi-
sions and the legislative history that accompanies them are perhaps more
important for what they omit: neither suggests that single asset cases are
to be treated any differently than the ordinary case involving multiple
assets and more numerous creditors. The fact that Congress chose
neither to restrict single asset cases nor to treat them separately, despite
the long history of such cases under Chapter XII and the explosion of
such cases that preceded the development of the Bankruptcy Code, sug-
gests that Congress saw such cases as not fundamentally different than
other individual, partnership or corporate debtor cases.12
II. THE TYPICAL SINGLE ASSET CASE
There are many variations of the single asset case, and some are not
very different from the typical multiple asset case. Some, like the case of
a debtor that owns and operates a hotel, may involve an ongoing business
that has numerous employees and many classes of creditors. But one
may nevertheless discern a set of facts that typifies the most common
single asset cases, and which, collectively, may form a paradigm of the
single asset case. Taken together, the characteristics of the typical single
asset case are the following:
1. The debtor is an investment vehicle, usually a partnership but
occasionally a corporation, that was formed for the purpose of holding
the single asset as an investment, rather than to operate an ongoing busi-
ness. As such, the demise of the debtor will not mean that a business
fails and that employees lose their jobs, but rather that the particular
owners of the partnership or corporation will lose their equity as credi-
tors take over the asset.
2. The asset owned by the debtor is almost always real estate. The
real estate is generally income producing, given the obvious and generally
insurmountable difficulties of reorganizing a non-income-producing
asset.
3. The immediate cause of the filing of the case is usually a default
12. Reviewing the legislative history of Bankruptcy Code provisions relevant to all real estate
cases, whether having single or multiple assets, one court has concluded that Congress "adopted a
... middle position on the question of single asset real estate cases in bankruptcy." In re Greystone
III Joint Venture, supra note 8, at 566. The Greystone court noted a number of provisions that
appear to cut in different directions, leaving the Code "rife with inconsistencies" when applied to
single asset real estate cases. Id.
1991]
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in one or more secured obligations. Unsecured obligations, typically
trade debt arising from the operation of the single asset, are much less
significant and generally are a small fraction of the debtor's total obliga-
tions. The case usually centers around a dispute with one or more se-
cured creditors, because unsecured creditors (and in some cases, junior
secured creditors) have little or no hope of recovering on their claims
absent a successful reorganization.
4. The debtor's default in its secured obligations is generally the
result of a recession or other cause that leads to a reduction in occupancy
and rentals, leaving the debtor with too little cash flow to service its se-
cured debt.
In this "typical" single asset case, the debtor's objects are easy to
understand and simple to state; the debtor seeks to retain its single asset
by restructuring its secured debt within the limits of its reduced cash
flow. Of course, this is not to say that all single asset cases are filed for
this purpose. Many cases have been filed for improper or ulterior mo-
tives, most often to retain property in which the debtor has no equity
without any additional capital contribution and with no serious intent to
pursue a plan of reorganization. The courts have uniformly condemned
such cases as lacking the "good faith" necessary to support a bankruptcy
case, and have often granted relief from the automatic stay or other relief
to creditors in such cases. 13
But here we are concerned with the legitimate Chapter 11 case, in
which a single asset debtor in good faith attempts to reorganize by re-
structuring its obligations. Clearly, a single asset debtor may restructure
its obligations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy
courts have approved plans that restructure secured debts in various
ways: by adding past-due principal and interest to the restructured bal-
ance of the indebtedness; by extending the term of the indebtedness, and
in some cases by reducing required principal payments for a period of
time; by reducing the interest rate from a higher rate agreed at the time
the indebtedness was incurred to a lower rate consistent with the market
at time of confirmation; by deferring all or a portion of the interest pay-
ments for a period of time; and by separately classifying and treating the
unsecured portion of an undersecured claim, in some cases paying only a
portion of the unsecured deficiency and discharging the balance.1 4
13. See generally Cohn, Good Faith and the Single Assets Debtor, 62 AM. BANKR. L. J. 131,
145-47 (1988).
14. Id. at 146-47; see also Anderson and Ziegler, supra note 2, at 720-28.
[Vol. 26:523
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III. CONFIRMATION IssuEs IN THE SINGLE ASSET CASE
A small number of issues are decisive when the typical single asset
debtor attempts to confirm a plan of reorganization in a Chapter 11 case.,
But before reviewing these issues, it is important to clarify the subject at
hand. We are here considering the usual case in which a single asset
debtor legitimately and in good faith attempts to reorganize by restruc-
turing its debts. Those cases in which single asset debtors file Chapter 11
petitions solely to delay foreclosure, with no legitimate intent to restruc-
ture their debts or otherwise reorganize, are subject to dismissal for lack
of good faith and are not dealt with here. Moreover, no attempt is made
to review the various confirmation requirements that must be met in all
cases but are not distinctive of single asset cases. The single asset debtor
must of course meet the same requirements for confirmation as must all
other debtors under Chapter 11. These requirements are set forth in
Bankruptcy Code section 1129, and no distinction is made in the statute
between single asset cases and other types of cases. Nevertheless, a typi-
cal single asset case can be reviewed in terms of the most common issues
that arise in the confirmation of plans in such cases.
A. Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(ii): The Feasibility Requirement
Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a)(ii) requires a finding that the plan
"is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further
financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor
under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in
the plan." This requires the debtor to demonstrate, in short, that its plan
is "feasible." This does not require the debtor to show that the plan is
guaranteed to succeed. Rather, feasibility means that the debtor must
demonstrate "a reasonable likelihood that the debtor will in fact be able
to perform its obligations under the plan as projected.""5 But proof of a
reasonable likelihood of success obviously must consist of more than the
debtor's optimistic hopes or speculation in the market place. The debtor
must demonstrate a reasonable assurance of the commercial viability of
its plan.16 The feasibility requirement is particularly troubling in a sin-
gle asset real estate case, where the debtor's problems typically begin
15. In re Wolf, 61 Bankr. 1010, 1011 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986). See also In Re Monnier Broth-
ers, 755 F.2d 1336, 1341 (8th Cir. 1985) ("success need not be guaranteed"); In Re Swiftco, Inc.,
1988 W. L. 143714 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); In Re White, 41 Bankr. 227, 230 (Bankr. N.D. Tenn.
1984).
16. See, e.g., In re Prudential Energy Company, 58 Bankr. 857, 862 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In
re Trail's End Lodge, Inc., 54 Bankr. 898, 905 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985).
1991]
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with an inadequate cash flow to service its secured obligations. Because
the debtor's single asset is usually an investment in managed real estate,
there is little the debtor can do to improve its cash flow. In some cases,
of course, the property has substantial deferred maintenance, and an in-
fusion in capital to repair and rehabilitate the property may improve cash
flow. But in most cases, the single asset debtor can do little but wait for
the economy to recover and for occupancy and rental rates of its single
asset to improve. This means that the debtor must propose some post-
ponement of payments due to the secured creditor, and in many cases
must postpone current (post-confirmation) payments of accruing interest
on the secured debt. This postponement amounts to a "negative amorti-
zation" of the indebtedness, in which the secured indebtedness increases
as unpaid accrued interest is added to the balance.
Where the plan proposes to defer all principal repayments and to
accrue but not pay post-confirmation interest for some period of time, the
feasibility of the plan necessarily depends upon a sale or refinance of the
property at some point in the future; this future sale or refinance in turn
is dependent upon an increase in the marketability and value of the prop-
erty. The obvious problem is that the property's marketability and value
in the future is difficult to predict and may be nothing more than specula-
tion. A plan dependent upon nothing more than speculation in the value
of the debtor's single asset is not feasible and cannot be confirmed.17
This does not mean, of course, that single asset plans of reorganiza-
tion never can feasibly postpone the payment of principal and interest to
secured creditors. A number of factors may support the feasibility of
such a plan. To begin with, a debtor might demonstrate substantial cur-
rent equity in its property. If the property could be liquidated at the time
of confirmation for more than sufficient cash to pay the debtor's obliga-
tions, the plan is not dependent on a speculative increase in value and it
may be feasible to accrue and postpone some payments. Such plans have
been confirmed in In re Pikes Peak Water Company," where the court
allowed a three year moratorium in payments to the secured creditor,
and in In re Nite Lite Inns,19 where the court upheld the feasibility of a
plan that provided for liquidation in three years, in the event that the
17. See, eq., In re Swiftco, Inc, supra note 15; In re Hoffman, 52 Bankr. 212, 215 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1985); In re Stoffel, 41 Bankr. 390, 393 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Landmark at Plaza
Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 658-59 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
18. 779 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1985).
19. 17 Bankr. 367, 369-70 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
[Vol. 26:523
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scheduled payments were not made to creditors.2"
Another factor that may support the feasibility of a plan that
postpones payment of principal and interest is the term of such deferral.
Many courts have held that the longer the extension of payments under
the plan, the more difficult it will be to demonstrate feasibility, and con-
versely that the shorter such term, the easier it will be to demonstrate
feasibility.21 Other factors also enter the analysis and in some cases will
support the feasibility of a single asset debtor's plan to defer payments:
the stability of the property's occupancy and rental rates, and current
trends toward improvement in those rates; the quality of the debtor's
management of the property, and its experience in managing or improv-
ing other similar properties; the court's perception of the market-place
for the debtor's asset, and of the likelihood for improvement in that mar-
ket in the near and long term; and the making of a capital contribution
pursuant to the plan, either to supplement payments to creditors or to
improve or rehabilitate the property. Obviously the court must take all
of these and many more factors into consideration in making the difficult
judgment call that is inherent in any feasibility determination. Feasibil-
ity may be particularly troubling in a single asset case, but in many situa-
tions the facts will point in favor of the feasibility of a single asset plan of
reorganization.
B. Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(b): The "'Fair and Equitable"
Requirement
Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a) lists twelve requirements for the
confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Among these is the rule stated
in section 1129(a)(8), which requires a finding that each class of impaired
creditors22 has accepted the plan. But this requirement is not absolute,
for section 1129(b) allows the bankruptcy court under certain circum-
stances to confirm a plan notwithstanding the rejection of the plan by one
or more classes of impaired creditors. Section 1129(b), the so-called
"cram-down" provision, allows the debtor to escape the requirements of
20. Cf. In re Landmark, supra note 17, at 658-59 (holding that a three year moratorium was not
feasible where the debtor did not have current equity in the property).
21. See, e.g., In re White, 36 Bankr. 199, 202-203 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983), and cases cited
therein.
22. A class of creditors is "impaired" unless, with respect to each creditor in the class, the plan
does one of the following: (1) leaves the creditor's rights unaltered; (2) cures any default to the
creditor, reinstates the maturity of the claim, and compensates the creditor for any damages caused
by the default; or (3) pays the creditor, in cash at the time of confirmation, the amount of its allowed
claim. Bankruptcy Code § 1124, 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
1991]1
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section 1129(a)(8), and thus to force the plan on rejecting impaired
classes, upon a finding that the plan "does not discriminate unfairly, and
is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that
is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan."
The term "fair and equitable" is not defined, but the statute does set
forth minimum standards that must be met by any fair and equitable
plan.23 Where the plan proposes that the debtor retain property that
secures a claim, section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) requires that to be fair and equi-
table with respect to a claim secured by the property, the creditor hold-
ing such a claim must retain its liens in the property and must receive
cash payments over time that both (1) total at least the allowed amount
of the claim, and (2) have a present value, at the time of confirmation, at
least equal to the allowed claim.24
The section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) requirement must be contrasted with
the feasibility requirement of section 1129(a)(11). Section 1129(b)
(2)(A)(i) does not require a finding of any particular degree of probability
with respect to the debtor's ability to make the payments required under
the plan. The section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) analysis requires only a mathe-
matical calculation: either the plan provides for payments of a sufficient
amount and of a sufficient present value, or it does not. Once the court
determines the amount of the creditor's allowed secured claim and the
appropriate interest or discount rate with which to evaluate future pay-
ments, the court need only discount the payments to be made under the
23. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1988), sets forth separate minimum
standards for secured creditors, § 1129(b)(2)(A); unsecured creditors, § 1129(b)(2)(B); and equity
interest holders, § 1129(b)(2)(C). To be "fair and equitable" with respect to a class of secured credi-
tors, the plan must meet any one of three minimum standards defined in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii) and
(iii). Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is applicable where the plan proposes a sale of the property securing
the claim, and § l129(b)(2)(A)(iil) is applicable where the plan proposes another treatment that is
"the indubitable equivalent" of the secured claim, such as abandonment of the property to the se-
cured creditor. But where, as in the typical single asset case, the debtor proposes to retain the
property, the plan must meet the minimum standard of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). See infra note 24.
24. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i); 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988), provides that to be "fair and
equitable" with respect to a class of claims that is secured by property not abandoned to the claim-
ants, the plan must provide:
(i) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether the
property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to
the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(ii) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred
cash payments totalling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's inter-
est in such property.
See generally Booth, The Cram-down on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement, 60 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 69, 87 (1986); Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram-down Under the New
Bankruptcy Law, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 133, 155 (1979).
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plan to a present value at the time of confirmation. Thus, for example, a
plan providing for no payments at all during its term but providing for a
single balloon payment at some distant point in the future would never-
theless meet the requirements of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) if the balloon
payment were so large that, when discounted at an appropriate rate, the
present value of the payment at the time of confirmation would be equal
to the creditor's allowed secured claim.
But while a plan retaining property must meet the standard of sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) to be "fair and equitable," it does not follow that
each plan to meet this test is necessarily "fair and equitable." Section
1129(b)(2) provides that "the condition that a plan be fair and equitable
with respect to a class includes the following requirements ..... " Bank-
ruptcy Code section 102(3) makes clear that the word "includes" is "not
limiting." Thus the section 1129(b)(2) tests are only minimal standards,
and are not intended as definitions of the "fair and equitable" require-
ment. As the legislative history makes clear:
Although many of the factors interpreting fair and equitable are speci-
fied in paragraph (2), others, which were explicated in the description
of section 1129(b) in the House Report, were omitted from the House
amendment to avoid statutory complexity and because they would un-
doubtedly be found by courts to be fundamental to "fair and equita-
ble" treatment of a dissenting class.25
Where a single asset plan meets the requirement of section
1129(b)(2)(A)(i) as to a secured creditor, the plan by definition proposes
to pay that creditor the full amount of its allowed secured claim; and
where the claim is to be paid over a period of time, the plan by definition
accrues and pays interest on the claim at a rate sufficient to insure the
present value of the claim. Where the court finds that this plan is feasi-
ble, therefore, it may be difficult to imagine what would not be "fair and
equitable" about the plan. After all, such a plan would require payment
in full of the secured creditor's allowed claim, on terms that would pro-
tect the present value of the claim and which the court found to be feasi-
ble. If the secured creditor is being paid the full present value of its
claim, in a plan that has been found to be feasible, might the secured
creditor still have a legitimate complaint?
In some cases, the courts have indeed found that secured creditors
have legitimate objections, under section 1129(b)(2), to a single asset plan
25. 124 CONG. REc. 32,407 (1978). See In re D & F Construction, Inc., 865 F.2d 673, 675 (5th
Cir. 1989); In re Spanish Lake Associates, 92 Bankr. 875, 878 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); In re Edge-
water Motel, Inc., 85 Bankr. 989, 998 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988).
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that provides for the payment of the secured claim on terms that are
otherwise sufficient and feasible. These objections seem to fall into two
categories. In the first, the plan has proposed such a substantial exten-
sion of the term of the indebtedness, or otherwise has so changed the
nature of the creditor's bargain, that the result goes beyond any "fair"
expectation of the creditor. This is the case in In re Stoffel,26 where the
bankruptcy court refused to confirm extensions of payments to secured
creditors for periods from 24 to 26 years. A similar case is In re Hoff-
man, 27 where the bankruptcy court found a plan not to be "fair and
equitable" where its treatment of the secured creditor called for a consol-
idation of loans, a substantial extension of loan terms, and a release of a
portion of the liens securing the loans. The court found that the plan did
not provide fair and equitable treatment of the secured claim because its
provisions so "substantially vari[ed] the terms and conditions of the orig-
inal agreement" with the creditor. Of course, this is not to say that the
terms of the creditor's bargain cannot be substantially changed; after all,
that is what plans of reorganization are all about. But it does mean that
there are reasonable limits, and that at some point a plan can so substan-
tially change the creditor's original bargain as not to be "fair and equita-
ble" within the meaning of section 1129(b)(2).
A second, and somewhat more common, objection under section
1129(b)(2) has to do with the assumption of the risks and benefits inher-
ent in any plan of reorganization. It is axiomatic that a plan may be
"feasible" without being "guaranteed of success." 2 Even where the plan
has "a reasonable likelihood of success," there are risks inherent in any
postponement of payments to creditors. There are many such risks in
any plan of reorganization, but two are foremost in the single asset case.
The first risk is the plan's dependence upon the future of the debtor's
single asset. Unless the debtor has provided a meaningful guaranty or
additional collateral to the secured creditor, the debtor's ability to meet
its obligations under the plan is entirely dependent upon the future of its
single asset because it has no other business or assets out of which to pay
creditors. The second risk arises from the appraisal process itself. Most
single asset cases involve real estate, and most such cases arise in de-
pressed markets where there are few sales of similar properties. No mat-
ter how convincing the expert testimony, the bankruptcy court must
26. 41 Bankr. 390, 393 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
27. 52 Bankr. 212, 217 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
28. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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recognize that "estimating the value of real estate, and especially fore-
casting it, is a speculative test."29
What is not "fair and equitable" about some single asset plans is
that they impose these downside risks on the secured creditor while re-
taining the upside benefits for the equity owners of the debtor. This oc-
curs in some cases where the plan proposes no payment of the principal
amount of the secured claim until some point in the future, and in some
cases where the plan postpones (or "negatively amortizes") post-confir-
mation interest. In such a plan, the debtor will make as little payments
as possible during the early years under the plan, while accruing interest
and promising to pay the creditor in a "balloon" payment due five years
or more in the future. Such a debtor is typically waiting for the real
estate market to improve, with the hope and expectation that it can sell
the property in the future, repay its creditors in full and retain equity.
This may be feasible to do, especially where the court finds that the prop-
erty is already worth more than debtor's obligations and where the court
has confidence in the future marketability and value of the property.
However, such a plan imposes the risk of failure on the secured creditor,
because the creditor will receive no payments, but merely the return of its
property, if the plan fails and the debtor cannot make the required bal-
loon payment.
This uncompensated risk led the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit to hold recently, in In re D & F ConstructionInc. ,30 that a plan pro-
viding for negative amortization of interest over a period of twelve years
with repayment of principal in fifteen years was not "fair and equitable."
The court explained:
We do not hold that there can never be an occasion when negative
amortization would be fair and equitable. We do say that this plan is
not fair and equitable. Negative amortization coupled with deferring
substantially all repayment of principal for fifteen years can only be
considered reasonable if one speculates that the present condition of
the Fort Worth, Texas real estate market will improve substantially.
While this speculation may be wholly acceptable from the standpoint
of the debtor and the other classes of creditors, it is an altogether im-
permissible speculation from the standpoint of [the secured creditor]
which is effectively denied access to the security contracted for during
the next fifteen years and must furnish further funding to the project. 31
29. In Re Swiftco, Inc., supra note 15.
30. 865 F.2d 673, 675-76 (5th Cir. 1989).
31. Id. at 676.
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Many bankruptcy courts have refused for the same reason to confirm
negative amortization plans. This was the case, for example, in In re
Memphis Partners, L.P.,32 where the court held that a negative amortiza-
tion plan was not fair and equitable because "in the early years of such
financing the creditor is at risk of not receiving the present value should
the plan end prematurely;" in In re Spanish Lake Associates,33 where the
court held that a plan requiring the secured creditor "to wait seven years
before the Debtor begins paying the full 10% plan interest rate, when the
figures presented suggest a risk of financial deficiency, is unduly burden-
some;" in In re McCombs Properties VIII, Ltd.,34 where the court held
that any deferral of post-confirmation interest would render the plan not
fair and equitable; and in In re Gemini at Dadeland, Ltd.,3" where the
court held that a negative amortizing plan required the secured creditor
to "assume a risk of its implementation without having received the in-
dubitable equivalent of its claim," and was therefore "unfair."36
However the analysis is framed, the bottom line is the same: a plan
is not fair and equitable where it imposes too much of the downside risk
of reorganization on the secured creditor relative to the upside benefits
retained for the debtor. This does not mean, of course, that single asset
plans may never postpone the payment of principal or interest to secured
creditors. Indeed, many courts have confirmed such single asset plans in
the face of rejecting classes of secured creditors. One such case is In re
Pikes Peak Water Company. 37 There the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held to be fair and equitable a plan that provided for a three-year
moratorium in payments of all principal and interest to the secured cred-
itor, with a balloon payment of the full principal and interest at the end
of that period. Although this imposed some risk on the secured creditor,
32. 99 Bankr. 385, 388 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).
33. 92 Bankr. 875, 879 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988).
34. 91 Bankr. 907, 911 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
35. 36 Bankr. 129, 131 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
36. The same conclusion was reached in two recent decisions using a somewhat different analy-
sis. In In re Lakeside Global II, Ltd., 116 Bankr. 499 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989), and In re Swiftco,
Inc., 1988 W.L. 143714 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988), the court argued that even the minimal mathemati-
cal standard of § 1129(b) (2)(A)(i) is not met where the plan imposes the downside risk on the
secured creditor while retaining the upside potential for the debtor. The court held that to meet the
requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), the plan must either assure the creditor that it will be paid in full,
or else must compensate the creditor for any risk of nonpayment by giving the creditor something of
value equal to the benefits of ownership that it would have obtained upon foreclosure. The court
reasoned that to comply with the "absolute priority rule" as codified in § 1129(b) (2) (A) (see supra
note 23) the secured creditor that is not assured of payment must receive the same value as would a
"new buyer" of the property; such a buyer would bear the downside risk but also would receive "the
potential of full benefits of any increase in value."
37. 779 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir.1985).
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the court found that the debtor had substantial equity in the property (a
valuation of $3.5 million against a secured indebtedness of $2.9 million),
and that a moratorium in such context was fair and equitable.38 Other
courts have approved deferrals of interest where the rate of interest is
sufficient to compensate the secured creditor for the additional risk im-
posed by the plan.39 Additionally, many courts have confirmed plans
that provided for the payment of current interest but postponed repay-
ments of principal for substantial terms.4°
As to a secured creditor, perhaps it can be said that, to be fair and
equitable, a single asset plan of reorganization must not impose a risk on
the creditor that is out of proportion to the benefits received by the credi-
tor under the plan. The more the plan imposes a risk on the secured
creditor, by extending the payment of principal and interest over a longer
period of time, the greater is the need to compensate the creditor for the
risk inherent in its increasing reliance on the single asset for repayment.
That compensation can take either of two forms. In the first place, the
plan can provide some greater assurance of repayment, such as a guar-
anty by some person or entity other than the debtor, or a contribution of
additional security or collateral. In the second place, the creditor can be
compensated by receiving a portion of the upside potential of reorganiza-
tion, either by the accrual of interest at a higher rate or by receiving an
equity interest or profits participation in the eventual sale of the prop-
erty. No test or formula can guide the bankruptcy judge in determining
whether the creditor has been sufficiently compensated for the risk it
must assume. Like feasibility, this determination is a judgment call: the
court must weigh the risks imposed on the creditor against the benefits
paid to the creditor in determining whether the plan is "fair and equita-
ble" as to the secured creditor.
C. Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i): The Interrelationship
Between Interest Rates and Valuation
In order to determine whether the minimum "fair and equitable"
38. See also In re Landmark at Plaza Parks, Ltd, 7 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (holding
that a plan providing for a three-year moratorium on payments of interest and principal was fair and
equitable, but nevertheless was not feasible).
39. See In re Pinebrook, Ltd., 85 Bankr. 160, 162 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Orosco, 77
Bankr. 246, 255-56 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
40. See In re Adamson Co., 42 Bankr. 169 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); In re White, 41 Bankr. 227
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Hollanger, 15 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981).
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test of Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) has been met, the bank-
ruptcy court must make two separate determinations. First, the court
must value the debtor's single asset; that being the security for the credi-
tor's claim. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 506(a), it is this value
that determines the amount of the creditor's allowed secured claim. Sec-
tion 506(a) divides the creditor's claim into two portions: an allowed
secured claim to the extent of the value of the property, and an allowed
unsecured claim to the extent of any deficiency.41 Second, the court must
determine the appropriate interest or discount rate to apply in determin-
ing the "present value" of the stream of payments proposed in the plan.
When these have been determined, it is a mere mathematical calculation
to determine whether the stream of payments proposed under the plan,
when discounted at the appropriate rate to a present value at the time of
confirmation, is at least equal to the allowed secured claim.42
Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code provides little guidance in de-
termining either of these matters. With respect to the valuation of the
property securing the claim, section 506(a) states only that: "Such valua-
tion shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of
the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with
any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such credi-
tor's interest." This ambiguity was intentional. As the legislative history
makes clear, Congress recognized that the statute "does not specify how
value is to be determined, nor does it specify when it is to be deter-
mined," and Congress left these matters "to case by case interpretation
and development."4 This has led the courts to consider various methods
of valuing property, and in some cases the courts have distinguished be-
tween the "liquidation" value that would be attained upon an immediate
sale and the "going concern" value that presupposes the debtor's reten-
tion of the property for some period of time. These distinctions are less
important, however, in the typical single asset case, since the debtor owns
only an investment asset and its ownership is not likely to add value to
the asset.
41. Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the
estate's interest in such property.... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value
of such creditor's interest.., is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
I I U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
42. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
43. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
54 (1978).
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The Bankruptcy Code likewise provides little guidance for determin-
ing the appropriate interest or discount rate. The courts and commenta-
tors have therefore devised a number of different and sometimes
conflicting means for determining the appropriate rate. The most com-
mon analysis is a comparison to the appropriate "market" rate of interest
for similar loans. As Collier explains, the "deferred payment of an obli-
gation under a plan is like a coerced loan and the rate of return with
respect to such loan must correspond to the rate which would be charged
or obtained by the creditor making a loan to a third party with similar
terms, duration, collateral and risk."'  Many courts have followed this
approach.45 Some courts have relied upon the contract rate of interest,
especially where the loan is recent and the contract is the best evidence of
the appropriate market rate.' 6 Other courts have relied on such compari-
sons as the legal rate of interest on judgments under state law,47 and
federal statutory rates. 8 One commentator suggests that the analysis
must begin with the rate paid on government securities or with the credi-
tor's cost of borrowing, to which should be added only a small risk fac-
tor. This conservative approach is intended to further a perceived policy
of encouraging successful reorganizations.4 9
While recognizing the many different methods of valuing property
and determining the appropriate interest rate, many courts and commen-
tators seem to overlook the interrelationship between the two. The typi-
cal secured creditor will argue, in the course of a plan confirmation
hearing, that the treatment of its claim under the plan should be com-
pared with new commercial loans made by the creditor and similar lend-
ers, and thus should bear the same interest rate as a new loan that might
be made by the creditor on a similar project. Indeed, a secured creditor
can be expected to argue that the interest rate should be much higher
than that appropriate to an ordinary commercial loan, given the risk im-
plicit in any bankruptcy reorganization. But this presupposes that, were
it not for the reorganization, the creditor would immediately liquidate its
collateral and receive cash in the full amount of its allowed secured
44. 5 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1129.031] (15th ed. 1979).
45. See, e.g., In re S. States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465
U.S. 1022 (1984), and cases cited therein.
46. See In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985).
47. See In re Anderson, 28 Bankr. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
48. See In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
49. See Carbiener, Present Value in Bankruptcy: the Search for An Appropriate Cramdown Dis-
count Rate, 32 S.D. L. REv. 42 (1987). Cf In Re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1990) (approving
interest rate equal to prime rate plus risk factor).
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claim, which cash would then be available for reinvestment at current
"market" rates of interest. This may be so, but only if the bankruptcy
court has calculated the creditor's allowed secured claim on the basis of a
rapid liquidation sale for cash. "Fair market value," by contrast, presup-
poses a reasonable time to market the property as well as available alter-
native financing. As a practical matter, a real estate lender that wants to
receive the full "market value" of its security in a distressed real estate
market must probably sell the property itself and provide financing for
the sale. The most appropriate market comparison might therefore be
with the financing extended by lenders to purchasers of their own fore-
closed properties. And that financing typically is made at below market
rates, not at the additional premium often demanded by the creditor in
the course of a confirmation hearing.
Thus a fair approach to the determination of interest rates must be-
gin with an understanding of the method by which the property has been
valued. Where the property has truly been valued on a liquidation basis,
and where this value represents the cash that could actually be obtained
upon the creditor's foreclosure and liquidation of its collateral, then a
true "market" rate of interest is more appropriate. But where the value
represents an appraised "fair market value," dependent upon longer term
marketing and reasonable financing, then the appropriate interest rate
should account for the lower rates that actually would be earned upon a
sale of the property at that price by the lender. Obviously, there is an
inverse relationship between the valuation of the asset and the appropri-
ate interest rate: the more liberal the method of valuing the property, the
lower the appropriate interest rate.
D. Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(b)(2)(B): Treatment of the Secured
Creditor's Unsecured Deficiency Claim
If the court values the debtor's single asset at an amount less than
the debtor's obligation to a secured creditor, then the creditor will have
an unsecured deficiency claim. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section
506(a), this deficiency is treated as an unsecured claim, separate and
apart from the creditor's secured claim.5 0 Thus, the unsecured deficiency
must be placed in a class separate from the secured claim and the plan
must propose a separate means for its payment. This creates an opportu-
nity for the single asset debtor, which may seek to pay less than the full
amount of the unsecured deficiency. If successful, this would allow the
50. See supra note 41.
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debtor to do what Congress sought to prevent by enacting Bankruptcy
Code section 111 (b): to "cash out" the secured creditor by paying the
amount of the allowed secured claim while not paying all of the un-
secured deficiency.
This might be accomplished where the unsecured deficiency is clas-
sified together with the claims of unsecured creditors willing to support
the plan, in number and amount sufficient to allow for acceptance of the
plan by the class as a whole notwithstanding the rejection of the plan by
the holder of the unsecured deficiency claim. Bankruptcy Code section
1122(a), which sets forth the standard for classification of claims and
interests, states only that the plan may place a claim in a particular class
if the claim "is substantially similar to the other claims . . . of such
class." Because the deficiency claim is nothing but an unsecured claim, it
can ordinarily be classified together with other unsecured claims, such as
trade debts, unsecured loans, and other unsecured deficiencies. The class
as a whole may accept the plan, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section
1126(c), by a vote in favor of the plan of at least two-thirds in amount
and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims in the class.
In the single asset case, however, the unsecured deficiency claim
commonly represents the bulk of the debtor's unsecured obligations.
Classifying the deficiency together with other unsecured claims in such a
case generally would not allow the debtor to force the plan on an ob-
jecting holder of an unsecured deficiency, whose vote is significant
enough to force the unsecured class to reject the plan. If a class of un-
secured creditors including the deficiency claim has voted to reject the
plan, or if a separately classified deficiency claim has voted to reject the
plan, the plan may then be forced on such an unsecured class only if it
meets the requirements of section 1129(b). These require that the plan
not discriminate unfairly, and that it be fair and equitable with respect to
each class of claims that has not accepted the plan.
This creates two difficulties for the single asset debtor. In the first
place, the requirement that the plan not discriminate unfairly may pre-
vent the debtor from paying a smaller proportion of a separately classi-
fied deficiency claim than is paid to other unsecured creditors, such as
trade debt."1 The second problem arises under section 1129(b)(2)(B),
which states the minimum requirement that must be met for a plan to be
51. See In re 222 Liberty Assoc., 108 Bankr. 971, 990-91 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Pine
Lake Village Apartment Co., 21 Bankr. 478, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). Cf In re Greystone III
Joint Venture, 102 Bankr. 560, 571-72 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, No. A-89-CA-667
(D.C.W.D. Tex. 1990, appeal filed).
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"fair and equitable" as to unsecured creditors. This statutory provision
is the codification of the "absolute priority rule" with respect to un-
secured creditors.12 The rule, which was long recognized though not
codified under the Bankruptcy Act, provides that a plan cannot be con-
firmed over the objection of a class of creditors unless (a) the class is
being paid in full, or (b) no junior class of creditors or equity interest
holders receives anything of value under the plan.5 3 An exception to this
rule was recognized in Case vs. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 4
which acknowledged that a debtor might infuse capital ("money or
money's worth") into a plan and thereby retain value not greater than
such capital even though one or more classes of creditors had not been
paid in full.
There is some dispute, however, as to whether section 1129(b)(2)(B)
codified this "fresh capital" exception to the absolute priority rule. The
statute provides that a plan of reorganization, to be fair and equitable
with respect to a class of unsecured creditors that is not paid the full
amount of its claims, must provide that no junior claim or interest "re-
ceive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest
any property." Some courts and commentators read the phrase, "on ac-
count of such junior claim or interest," to allow the debtor to retain
something of value in exchange for a new infusion of capital, but others
decline to so read this language and instead argue that the "fresh capital"
exception to the absolute priority rule was intentionally omitted by Con-
gress when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code.55 The Supreme Court,
which considered the reach of the "fresh capital" exception to the abso-
lute priority rule in Ahlers expressly chose not to reach this underlying
issue.56
52. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2)(B) provides that to be "fair and equitable" with respect to a
class of unsecured claims, the plan must meet one of two tests: (i) the plan provides that each holder
of a claim of such class receive or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or (ii) the holder of any claim
or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on
account of such junior claim or interest any property.
53. See Norwest Bank of Worthington vs. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
54. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
55. Compare In re Rudy Debruyker Ranch, Inc., 84 Bankr. 187 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988) with
In re Snyder, 105 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989).
56. Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 203 n.3. The issue in Ahlers was whether the debtor's post-confirmation
labor (or "sweat equity") could qualify as "money or money's worth" and therefore constitute the
"fresh capital" that would justify an exception to the absolute priority rule. The Court held that
"sweat equity" was not "money or money's worth," and declined to reach what appeared to be the
threshold issue: whether the Bankruptcy Code had "dropped the infusion-of-new-capital exception
to the absolute priority rule." Id. See Powlen & Wuhrman, The New Value Exception to the Absolute
Priority Rule: Is Ahlers the Beginning of the End?, 93 COM. L.J. 303, 314-17 (1988).
[Vol. 26:523
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss4/3
SINGLE ASSET CHAPTER 11 CASES
The bottom line is this: if the "fresh capital" exception to the abso-
lute priority rule still exists, then it would seem that a single asset debtor
could still "cash out" a secured creditor by contributing to the plan fresh
capital in an amount at least equal to the value retained by the debtor
under the plan. For example, in a case where property is valued at $1
million and the secured creditor has a claim of $1.5 million, the equity
interest in the debtor might contribute $100,000, to be used to pay a
portion of the unsecured deficiency claim. The debtor might argue that
in discharging the balance of the creditor's unsecured deficiency claim, it
is retaining an interest in property that has little or no current value, and
is certainly no greater than the fresh capital contribution.57 That being
the case, the secured creditor faced with a "cash out" of its allowed un-
secured (deficiency) claim would have to retreat to the protection of
Bankruptcy Code section 1111(b), the provision that was enacted by
Congress to protect against such a'plan.58 But section 1111(b) is an
imperfect protection. Section 1111(b)(1), which gives the creditor "re-
course" and thus allows an unsecured claim even where the debtor has
no personal liability, does not prevent the owners of the debtor from con-
tributing sufficient capital to meet the "fresh capital" exception to the
absolute priority rule. Of course, the secured creditor might then elect
the application of section 1111(b)(2), which requires the debtor to treat
the entire claim as "a secured claim to the extent that such claim is al-
lowed." Instead of two separate claims, one secured and one unsecured,
the creditor will have a single secured claim. The plan must then meet
the requirements of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), which sets the minimum
standard that a plan must meet to be fair and equitable with respect to a
secured class. To meet this standard, the plan must provide for pay-
ments to the secured creditor in an amount totalling at least the amount
of the secured claim, including that portion that would have been un-
secured but for the section 1111(b) election. But while the payments
must total the full amount of the claim, the payments may be made over
time; and, pursuant to section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), the present value of this
stream of payments need not be greater than the "value of [the creditor's]
interest" in the property securing the claim. Thus, in the case where the
property is worth $1 million but the secured creditor has a claim of $1.5
million, the plan might provide for payment of $1.5 million over a long
57. Such a "cash out" of the secured creditor was allowed in In re Greystone III Joint Venture,
supra note 51. The Greystone court confirmed a plan in which the debtor paid only three percent
(3%) of both the trade debt and the separately classified deficiency claim.
58. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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period of time at a low rate of interest; the rate may be so low that the
present value of the income stream is only $1 million.
This is an imperfect protection for the secured creditor, because it
seems to rest on a presumption that the property will be sold before the
conclusion of the plan term, requiring the debtor to pay the full face
amount of the indebtedness. If, instead, the debtor retains the property
for the full term of the plan, then the creditor has been "cashed out" by
payments which, calculated to their present value at confirmation, do not
exceed the value of the property at that time. Despite the intent of sec-
tion 1111(b), such a creditor has not received any of the post-confirma-
tion appreciation in the value of the property. A related problem is that
section 1111 (b) does not provide that the debtor's obligation shall not be
assumable. Thus, the debtor might sell the property at a substantial
profit, retaining the proceeds for itself and leaving the secured creditor
with a low interest long-term loan. There does not appear to be any
reported case in which such an attempt has been addressed, but the court
faced with such a plan should remember that section 1129(b)(2)(A) states
only a minimum requirement, not a definition of "fair and equitable."
Thus the secured creditor may argue that even though such a "cash out"
meets the literal terms of sections 111 l(b) and 1 129(b)(2), it would not be
fair and equitable to allow the debtor to retain all of the post-confirma-
tion appreciation in the value of the property.
E. Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(10): The Requirement for a
Single Consenting Class
Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a)(10) requires that so long as any
class of claims is impaired, the plan may not be confirmed unless "at least
one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan,
determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider."
This section requires a minimum level of acceptance for all plans of reor-
ganization. The requirement that at least one class of impaired claims
vote to accept the plan cannot be cured by a reliance on section 1129(b);
absent the approval of at least one class of impaired claims, the bank-
ruptcy court has no authority to confirm the plan even if it does not
discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable with respect to all classes
of creditors.59 This provision creates a problem for some single asset
debtors, where the debtor has only a single secured creditor and either
negligible or no noninsider unsecured debt. As a result of section
59. See L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.02 (15th ed. 1979).
[Vol. 26:523
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss4/3
SINGLE ASSET CHAPTER 11 CASES
1129(a)(10), a lone noninsider creditor possesses an "absolute veto
power" over the confirmation of a Chapter ll plan of reorganization. 60
A single asset debtor may plan its filing so as to leave at least some
unsecured trade creditors to form a consenting impaired class. But if the
secured creditor is left with any unsecured deficiency, the secured credi-
tor may cause the unsecured class to vote to reject the plan.61 With this
in mind, some debtors have sought to classify the unsecured trade debt
separately from the unsecured deficiency claim, in order to create a small
impaired but accepting class. Bankruptcy Code section 1122(a) allows
claims to be classified together only if the claims are "substantially simi-
lar," but the statute does not require the converse, that is, that all "sub-
stantially similar" claims be classified together. Some courts have thus
allowed separate classifications of unsecured claims, even when done to
create an accepting impaired class, so long as the plan does not "unfairly
discriminate" against either class. 2 Other courts have broadly disap-
proved of such separate classifications.63
An impaired accepting class may not be created out of the equity
interests in the debtor, even if they reject all or a part of their equity
interests and thereby become impaired. This was rejected as a second
attempt to comply with section 1129(a)(10) in In Re Pine Lake Village
Apartment Co.,6" where again the court refused to confirm the plan. As
the court explained, section 1129(a)(10) requires one accepting impaired
class of claims; the interests of limited partners or other owners of the
debtor do not constitute "claims" as they are defined in the Bankruptcy
Code.65 A related issue, which does not seem to have been addressed in
any reported decision, is whether an impaired accepting class may be
created out of a de minimus amount of unsecured debt. One may ques-
tion, for example, whether a class of unsecured trade debt of, say, $5,000,
60. In re Gagel & Gagel, 30 Bankr. 627, 629, (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). See also In re Anderson
Oaks (Phase I) Ltd. Partnership, 77 Bankr. 108, 111-12 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987).
61. This assumes that the secured creditor has not elected, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 1111(b), to have its entire claim treated as a single secured claim. Needless to say, a secured
creditor may choose to forego such election for the purpose of casting a vote against the plan in the
unsecured class.
62. See In re 222 Liberty Assoc., 108 Bankr. 971, 989-90 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Grey-
stone III Joint Venture, 102 Bankr. 560, 566-72 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, No. A-89-CA-667
(D.C.W.D. Tex. 1990) (appeal filed); In re Ag Consultants Grain Div., Inc., 77 Bankr. 665 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1987).
63. See In re Waterways Barge Partnership, 104 Bankr. 776, 783-86 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1989);
In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 831 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to
allow such "gamesmenship in vote getting").
64. 21 Bankr. 478, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
65. Id. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(4), (16), 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4), (16) (1988).
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could constitute an "accepting class" under section 1129(a)(10) in the
face of a secured claim in the amount of $1 million.
IV. CONCLUSION
Confirming a plan of reorganization in a single asset Chapter 11 case
is no easy task. The debtor must overcome substantial obstacles to
demonstrate feasibility, to convince the court that the plan is fair and
equitable as to dissenting impaired creditors, and in some cases even to
establish a consenting class of creditors. It is not surprising, therefore,
that non-consensual confirmed plans in such cases are rare. In many
cases, however, Chapter 11 provides the breathing spell and the frame-
work for negotiations that makes it possible for the debtor to reach agree-
ment with its creditors.
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